Environmental Contamination during Influenza A Virus (H5N1) Outbreaks, Cambodia, 2006 by Vong, Sirenda et al.
Environmental 
Contamination 
during Inﬂ  uenza A 
Virus (H5N1) 
Outbreaks, 
Cambodia, 2006
Sirenda Vong,* Sowath Ly,* Sek Mardy,* 
Davun Holl,† and Philippe Buchy*
To determine potential risk for bird-to-human trans-
mission during inﬂ  uenza A virus (H5N1) outbreaks among 
backyard poultry in rural Cambodia, we collected environ-
mental specimens. Viral RNA was detected in 27 (35%) of 
77 specimens of mud, pond water, water plants, and soil 
swabs. Our results underscore the need for regular disinfec-
tion of poultry areas.
B
y June 19, 2007, the current epizootic of inﬂ  uenza A 
virus (H5N1) had caused 317 human cases in 12 coun-
tries, including 7 patients in Cambodia, all of whom died 
(1). Direct contact between infected bird secretions and hu-
man respiratory mucosa is thought to play an major role 
in poultry-to-human transmission (2). The role of indirect 
contact in virus transmission remains poorly understood. 
A few studies have suggested that some avian inﬂ  uenza 
viruses can be maintained in water fowl populations by wa-
terborne transmission (3). Moreover, experimental studies 
have shown many types of avian inﬂ  uenza viruses could 
persist for a few months in cold waters or up to 8 days in 
feces at 22ºC (4). However, results obtained with various 
subtypes of inﬂ  uenza A virus may not apply to the current 
H5N1 subtype. Further, data are lacking regarding the sur-
vival of subtype H5N1 in natural settings and conditions.
As an exploratory step, we have introduced environmental 
sampling during responses to inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) outbreaks. 
This report summarizes the results of the environmental 
investigations conducted in 3 villages with inﬂ  uenza virus 
(H5N1)–associated outbreaks in Kampong Cham and Prey 
Veng provinces, Cambodia, February–August 2006.
The Study
Cambodia is tropical and remains hot (24°–38ºC) all 
year with a rainy (May–October) and a dry (November–
April) season. In response to notiﬁ  cation of a conﬁ  rmed 
case of inﬂ  uenza subtype H5N1 infection in humans or 
poultry, we surveyed all households located within a 1-km 
radius of the outbreak site. We gathered data on proportion 
of deaths in poulty ﬂ  ocks and on interaction with other 
species by conducting interviews. We also collected cor-
responding environmental specimens in some households 
and their surroundings, selected by proximity to the index 
household. We swabbed surfaces and collected materials 
by using 10-mL sterile ﬂ  asks in the areas where poultry 
were reported to be free ranging. Swabs were placed in 
1.5-mL virus transport medium; all environmental sam-
ples were transported at 4°C within 36 hours to Institut 
Pasteur in Cambodia for subtype H5N1 testing by real-
time reverse transcription–PCR (rRT-PCR) after RNA 
extraction by using a viral RNA kit (QIAamp, QIAGEN, 
Valencia, CA, USA) and for virus isolation after inocula-
tion onto MDCK cells. From each household’s ﬂ  ock, we 
collected sick poultry and carcasses for subtype H5N1 vi-
rus testing, sampled 10 randomly selected ducks, and bled 
and swabbed cloacae and tracheas. Swab specimens were 
tested by hemagglutination after egg inoculation; positive 
samples were conﬁ  rmed by rRT-PCR, and serum samples 
were tested by hemagglutination-inhibition assay with H5 
antigens provided by the World Animal Health Reference 
Laboratory (Weybridge, UK). An inﬂ  uenza (H5N1)–as-
sociated household was deﬁ  ned as a household or a vil-
lage poultry farm where 1) an inﬂ  uenza (H5N1)–infected 
patient resided, 2) inﬂ   uenza (H5N1) was identiﬁ  ed  in 
poultry, or 3) duck serum specimens were positive by he-
magglutination-inhibition test for anti–inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) 
antibodies (5). Of note, none of the poultry owners who 
were interviewed reported having been vaccinated against 
“bird ﬂ  u” (data not shown).
We collected a total of 167 environmental samples 
collected in 43 households; of 77 samples collected in 14 
household areas, 27 (35%) were found positive for sub-
type H5N1 by rRT-PCR. Of these 14, the median positiv-
ity rate per household was 50% (range 9%–100%). Viral 
RNA was frequently detected in poultry feces (50%), soil 
swab specimens (50%), water plants in households’ ponds 
(50%), swabs collected from feathers of recently dead poul-
try (50%), followed by results from mud collection (29%) 
(online Appendix Table 1, available from www.cdc.gov/
EID/content/14/8/1303-appT1.htm). The subtype H5N1 
genome was similarly identiﬁ  ed in moist and dry surfaces 
(38% vs. 57%, p = 0.41). Viral loads were highest in con-
taminated mud (mean 94,000 copies). However, no viruses 
were subsequently isolated from the positive environmen-
tal specimens after 5 passages on MDCK cells.
All initially surveyed households owned chickens 
(5%), ducks (31%), or both (64%), although most poul-
try ﬂ  ocks were small (median 20, range 1–60 for chickens 
median 141, range 2–1,600 for ducks). All poultry were 
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common. Deaths had occurred in the previous 3 months 
among 29 (67%) of the 43 households’ ﬂ  ocks, although the 
ﬂ  ock mortality rate had a wide range (30%–100%). Of the 
14 inﬂ  uenza (H5N1)–associated household areas, 4 had no 
evidence of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) infection in poultry ﬂ  ocks, 
including household 12 in which no poultry died (online 
Appendix Table 2, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/14/8/1303-appT2.htm).
No association was found between positive environ-
mental results and ﬂ  ock deaths or subtype H5N1–infected 
ﬂ  ocks. Of the 29 households at which poultry died, the me-
dian interval between the sampling date and death of the 
last bird was shorter among the 10 households for which 
environmental samples were positive (median days 0.5 vs. 
16, p = 0.005) compared with 19 households with envi-
ronmental samples with negative results. In addition, viral 
RNA was found to be detectable in the environment up to 
12 days after the end of the ﬂ  ock outbreak. This RNA was 
present in soil beneath poultry cages with a viral load of 
11,000 copies.
Conclusions
Our  ﬁ  ndings demonstrate that viral RNA was fre-
quently present on various environmental surfaces or ma-
terials in the inﬂ  uenza (H5N1)–associated households and 
their surroundings. The presence of viral genome in wa-
ter and feces supports R. Webster’s ﬁ  nding (R. Webster, 
unpub. data) that the viruses could remain detectable in 
water and wet feces up to 4–6 days at 37°C (6). In addi-
tion, using regular techniques, we detected viral RNA in 
small volumes of unconcentrated water and in pond wa-
ter plants, which suggests that levels of inﬂ  uenza A virus 
(H5N1) in these contaminated waters might have been 
relatively high (6). Notably, mud collection and dry soil 
swabbing have been efﬁ  cient in detecting viral RNA in a 
contaminated environment. Nonetheless, the presence of 
RNA does not necessarily imply that the virus is alive or 
that transmission can occur; in addition, we were unable 
to isolate the virus by culture. This lack of culture growth 
may be related to a number of factors, including the fact 
that viruses could be short lived, whereas the decay of 
subtype H5N1 RNA may have been sufﬁ  ciently slow to 
enable detection by rRT-PCR. Also, a live virus adsorbed 
on soil microparticles may have prevented viral binding 
onto MDCK cells, or these inoculated cell lines may have 
been damaged by bacteria or fungi present in the environ-
mental specimens (7). 
We used the interval between the last dead bird and the 
sample collection dates as a potential reﬂ  ection of the sur-
vival of the virus in a natural setting. However, this interval 
may be subject to some limitations. First, we were not able 
to prove that infectious viruses were recovered after this in-
terval. Second, these viruses could have been shed by duck 
survivors a long time after the end of the outbreak. Finally, 
interpretations were difﬁ  cult because our analyses were 
limited by the modest number of ﬂ  ocks studied. Notably, 
however, an interval of 12 days was reported in 1 house-
hold, although none of the remaining birds was infected or 
had markers of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) infection; this suggests 
that the virus was shed by the last dead birds infected and 
detected 12 days later.
Bird-to-human transmission is believed to occur 
largely through direct contact between infected bird se-
cretions and human respiratory mucosa by inhalation of 
infectious droplets or transfer with contaminated hands 
to the upper respiratory tract through the nose, mouth,or 
conjunctival mucosa; subtype H5N1 has been understood 
to replicate primarily in the human respiratory tract (7–9). 
However, additional evidence suggests that inﬂ  uenza vi-
rus (H5N1) also replicates in the gastrointestinal tract, 
which indicates that ingestion of contaminated food (e.g., 
drinking duck blood) or water is not a negligible source 
of transmission (6,10–12). Most rural Cambodian house-
holds possess small ponds (≈10–20 m2), which serve as 
water reservoirs for backyard animals and gardens. Ducks 
gather and deposit large amounts of feces in these ponds, 
while at the same time children commonly bath and play 
in them. Taken together, widespread dissemination of the 
virus in a subtype H5N1–infected household and high 
interaction between humans and poultry, the birds’ en-
vironment may be particularly worrisome (13). On the 
other hand, current strains of subtype H5N1 may not yet 
easily be transmitted from poultry to humans; however, 
this transmission could increase as the virus continues 
to circulate and evolve (3,14). In addition to illustrating 
the need for good poultry-handling practices, our results 
underscore the importance of the following for prevent-
ing disease transmission: general basic hygiene, fencing 
domestic birds, and regular environmental disinfection of 
poultry places (3,15).
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